Does Contracting Out Increase the Efficiency of Government Programs? Evidence From Medicaid HMOs by Duggan, Mark
University of Pennsylvania
ScholarlyCommons
Health Care Management Papers Wharton Faculty Research
12-2004
Does Contracting Out Increase the Efficiency of
Government Programs? Evidence From Medicaid
HMOs
Mark Duggan
University of Pennsylvania
Follow this and additional works at: http://repository.upenn.edu/hcmg_papers
Part of the Health and Medical Administration Commons, Health Services Administration
Commons, and the Other Public Health Commons
This paper is posted at ScholarlyCommons. http://repository.upenn.edu/hcmg_papers/109
For more information, please contact repository@pobox.upenn.edu.
Recommended Citation
Duggan, M. (2004). Does Contracting Out Increase the Efficiency of Government Programs? Evidence From Medicaid HMOs.
Journal of Public Economics, 88 (12), 2549-2572. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jpubeco.2003.08.003
Does Contracting Out Increase the Efficiency of Government Programs?
Evidence From Medicaid HMOs
Disciplines
Health and Medical Administration | Health Services Administration | Other Public Health
This journal article is available at ScholarlyCommons: http://repository.upenn.edu/hcmg_papers/109
 
 
 
Does Contracting Out Increase the 
Efficiency of Government Programs? 
Evidence from Medicaid HMOs 
 
 
Mark Duggan* 
University of Maryland and NBER 
duggan@econ.bsos.umd.edu 
 
 
 
 
State governments contract with health maintenance organizations (HMOs) to coordinate medical care for 
nearly 20 million Medicaid recipients. Identifying the causal effect of HMO enrollment on government 
spending and health care quality is difficult if, as is often the case, recipients have the option to enroll in a 
plan.  To estimate the average effect of HMO enrollment, this paper exploits county-level mandates 
introduced during the last several years in the state of California that required most Medicaid recipients to 
enroll in a managed care plan.  The empirical results demonstrate that the resulting switch from fee-for-
service to managed care was associated with a substantial increase in government spending but no 
corresponding improvement in infant health outcomes.  The findings cast doubt on the hypothesis that 
HMO contracting has reduced the strain on government budgets. 
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1. Introduction 
A central issue in public finance concerns the desirability of contracting public services out to the 
private sector.  Advocates of contracting out argue that private firms are more efficient and are more 
likely to offer a range of services that will allow each individual to get closer to her preferred bundle.  
Opponents assert that private firms reduce non-contractible quality and avoid unprofitable clients.  As 
previous researchers have noted, the optimal public-private mix is likely to vary across government 
services, with an easy-to-monitor service like garbage collection a strong candidate for contracting out 
and national defense located at the opposite end of the spectrum (Shleifer, 1998). 
Though the extent of private sector involvement has been growing for a number of government 
services in the U.S., perhaps the most striking recent change has been the increasing role of private 
managed care organizations in the government’s Medicare and Medicaid programs. Rather than directly 
reimbursing hospitals, physicians, and other health care providers, the federal and individual state 
governments now contract with HMOs and similar managed care organizations to coordinate medical 
care for more than one-third of the 75 million beneficiaries of these two programs. In most cases, the 
managed care plans are paid a fixed amount each month per enrollee.  This payment may vary with 
recipient characteristics but typically does not increase if the recipient’s health deteriorates or if she 
receives intensive treatments. 
This shift from fee-for-service to managed care was to some extent motivated by a desire to 
reduce both the level and the growth rate of expenditures in these two public programs.  Taken together, 
Medicare and Medicaid now account for more than $550 billion in government spending and are 
projected to account for an increasing share of GDP in future years.  While these two programs provide 
valuable insurance to two of society’s most vulnerable groups – the elderly and the poor – the method of 
payment that Medicare and Medicaid use introduces significant distortions in medical care purchase 
decisions.  Because the fee-for-service system does not constrain health care utilization and program 
participants only face a fraction of the price of additional medical care, individuals are likely to consume 
some services that provide a benefit substantially less than the cost. 
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If managed care plans have information about the value that their Medicare and Medicaid 
enrollees are likely to place on particular treatments, they may be well positioned to reduce medical care 
utilization while still providing valuable insurance against adverse health shocks.1  In the limit, the set of 
marginal services - those covered by fee-for-service but not under managed care - would yield no health 
benefit and thus medical care spending could decline with no change in individuals’ health outcomes.  
Depending on the extent of moral hazard in medical care purchase decisions, the government could 
potentially lower public medical spending by contracting with organizations that can constrain health care 
utilization and more accurately measure the costs and benefits of particular services. 
There are three additional channels through which HMOs could lower health care spending and 
increase the efficiency of medical care.  First, because their reimbursement does not increase in response 
to changes in the health of their enrollees, managed care organizations will have a financial incentive to 
keep their beneficiaries healthy.  Thus plans may use their superior information about the benefits of 
health care treatments and lifestyle changes to encourage decisions that will lower future demand for 
medical care services.  Additionally, plans may be able to negotiate lower input prices from medical care 
suppliers, with recent work showing that private managed care plans pay lower prices than their private 
fee-for-service counterparts for the same services (Cutler, McClellan, Newhouse, 2000). And finally, if 
the government contracts with multiple managed care plans, then the resulting competition and the 
increase in the number of options that program participants have may lead to substantial improvements in 
medical care quality.  For these reasons, it is possible that managed care plans can increase efficiency – 
either through a reduction in spending or by improving health care quality. 
While the set of arguments in favor of contracting with HMOs is extensive, other theoretically 
appealing hypotheses suggest that shifting Medicare and Medicaid recipients to managed care will reduce 
program efficiency. Because each program insures approximately 40 million individuals, the federal and 
individual state governments are likely to have more market power than a typical HMO and may therefore 
                                                 
1 See Glied (2000), Miller and Luft (1997), and Cutler, McClellan, and Newhouse (2000) for more detailed 
discussions of the potential effects of managed care. 
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be able to negotiate lower prices for medical care.2  Additionally, to the extent that there are increasing 
returns to scale in program administration, contracting with multiple plans will increase total costs and 
reduce the fraction of spending devoted to medical care services.  Third, the costs to the government will 
depend not just on the costs to the managed care organization but also on the amount by which plans 
markup their bids when competing for Medicaid HMO contracts. If the bidding process is not particularly 
competitive, then this markup could be substantial.  And finally, because HMOs are reimbursed a fixed 
amount per recipient that depends on a limited set of observable characteristics, they may have an 
incentive to provide a mix of services that discourages some individuals from enrolling. 
It is therefore largely an empirical question whether the shift from fee-for-service to managed 
care has increased the efficiency of these two large government programs.  Medicare is a federally funded 
and administered program in which recipients have the option to enroll in an HMO but are not required to 
do so.  Identifying the effect of managed care enrollment in this program is difficult for two reasons.  
First, because virtually all Medicare recipients can enroll in a managed care plan, it is likely that those 
who choose to enroll will differ in unobservable ways from those who do not.  Second, even if one looks 
at changes in a particular recipient’s spending or health outcomes following a switch into or out of 
managed care, it is plausible that a change in health and thus in the demand for medical care services 
caused the change.   
In contrast to the Medicare program, Medicaid is administered by state governments and there is 
substantial variation across states and localities in the rules that influence Medicaid managed care 
enrollment.  Furthermore, many Medicaid recipients are required to enroll in an HMO.  Thus both of the 
obstacles to identification are less of an issue for this program. 
In this paper, I estimate the effect of HMO contracting by exploiting twenty county-level 
mandates passed in the state of California at different times during the 1990s that required millions of 
                                                 
2 A number of models predict that price discounts will increase with the market share of the buyer.  See Stoles and 
Zwiebel (1996) for the case of a monopoly supplier and Snyder (1998) for an example with competing suppliers. 
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Medicaid recipients to enroll in an HMO.3   This study represents the first one to utilize individual-level 
data to measure both the spending and the health outcome effects of such an ambitious shift in the 
insurance coverage of the Medicaid population.4  Because the date that each Medicaid managed care 
mandate would take effect in each county was chosen far in advance by state government officials, I 
argue below that these laws provide plausibly exogenous variation in HMO enrollment among Medicaid 
recipients.  In virtually every county that introduced a mandate, there was an immediate and significant 
increase in Medicaid HMO enrollment.  The number of Medicaid managed care plans varied across 
counties, but in all cases the state government paid HMOs a fixed amount per recipient-month and the 
plans then paid hospitals, physicians, pharmacies, and other health care providers for medical care 
services.  Recipients continued to bear no financial cost for any services covered by Medicaid – both the 
deductible and the co-pay remained at zero.5 
 In the first part of my empirical analysis, I use complete claims data for a 20% sample of 
California’s Medicaid recipients to investigate the effect of HMO enrollment on total Medicaid spending.  
I focus on AFDC-linked6 Medicaid recipients because these individuals were differentially affected by the 
mandates, while HMO enrollment for other Medicaid recipients (e.g. blind and disabled beneficiaries of 
the SSI program) in most counties with a mandate remained voluntary.  My final sample consists of panel 
data for nearly 1.2 million AFDC recipients with at least one month of Medicaid eligibility in the state of 
                                                 
3 In the discussion that follows, I use the terms HMO and managed care plan interchangeably.  It is worth noting that 
HMOs represent one type of managed care, but that other types of insurance would also be classified as managed 
care (e.g. preferred provider organizations).  Because all of the 44 plans that have contracts in counties with a 
mandate are most accurately classified as HMOs, I do not distinguish between HMOs and other plan types. 
4 A substantial body of research examines the effect of Medicaid managed care on measures of health care quality 
(see Kaiser (1995) for a review) though few focus on health outcomes.  Recent exceptions include Levinson and 
Ullman (1998) and Kaestner, Dubay, and Kenney (2002), with both studies using infant health as the outcome 
variable of interest.  Notable papers that estimate the effect of Medicaid managed care on government spending 
include Leibowitz, Buchanan, and Mann (1992), Buchanan, Leibowitz, and Keesey (1996), and Goldman, 
Leibowitz, and Buchanan (1998).  All three of these studies have the advantage of random assignment, though each 
one examines just one pilot managed care plan.  The current study considers the effect of nearly 50 HMOs for a 
substantially longer time period and also considers the effect of these plans on health outcomes. 
5 See Ellis and McGuire (1993) and Newhouse (1996) for a discussion of the tradeoffs associated with different 
degrees of supply and demand-side cost-sharing. 
6 The AFDC program was replaced by other programs in 1997.  The largest of these other programs is CalWorks 
(California’s name for Temporary Assistance to Needy Families), with the next largest including individuals eligible 
for Medicaid through Section 1931b of Title XIX of the Social Security Act.  To simplify the discussion, I use the 
term AFDC throughout this paper. 
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California between January of 1993 and December of 1999.  Using the existence of a mandate as an 
instrumental variable for enrollment in an HMO, my findings demonstrate that the average effect of the 
switch in enrollment induced by the mandates was to increase Medicaid spending by approximately 17%. 
Whether the increase in government spending was associated with an improvement in health 
outcomes is the subject of the second part of my empirical analysis.  For this question, I am unable to use 
the Medicaid claims data described above, because once a fee-for-service Medicaid recipient enrolls in a 
managed care plan I no longer have detailed information about his/her health care utilization (from which 
health could be estimated).  I therefore use a different data source that is immune from this problem to 
estimate health among Medicaid recipients.  Specifically, I use hospital discharge data for the 1993-1999 
period to estimate the average health of Medicaid-insured infants at the county level.  My findings here 
suggest that the shift from fee-for-service to managed care was not associated with a significant 
improvement in infant health outcomes. 
Taken together, my results suggest that contracting with HMOs reduced the efficiency of 
California’s Medicaid program.  At a minimum, one can reject the hypothesis that the switch from fee-
for-service to managed care reduced the state government’s spending below what it otherwise would have 
been.  It is unclear whether these results generalize to other categories of Medicaid recipients, to other 
state Medicaid programs, or to the federal Medicare program.  But given that the mandates did mitigate 
the standard selection problem and that California’s HMO market is among the most competitive in the 
U.S., the expenditure results described below should give pause to those who believe that HMO 
contracting is an effective strategy for controlling current and future public medical spending. 
2. Medicaid Managed Care Background 
California’s Medicaid program currently provides health insurance to nearly 6.5 million low-
income individuals.  Program participants are a diverse group, including newborn infants, the 
institutionalized elderly, and individuals in dozens of other Medicaid eligibility categories.  Until the early 
1990s, the vast majority of program participants were enrolled in a fee-for-service program, with the state 
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of California directly reimbursing hospitals, physicians, pharmacies, and other health care providers for 
the costs associated with their medical care. 
Perhaps because of dissatisfaction with the fee-for-service system, the state of California passed 
legislation in 1991 and in 1992 that made it significantly easier for the state’s Department of Health 
Services to require certain groups of Medicaid recipients to enroll in an HMO.  Prior to this change, just 
12% of Medicaid recipients were voluntarily enrolled in a managed care plan.  But during the next eight 
years, the share of Medicaid recipients enrolled in an HMO consistently increased and stood at 51% by 
1999. As Table 1 demonstrates, this increase tracked the national increase quite closely, with the 
corresponding figures for the U.S. as a whole standing at 10% in 1991 and 56% in 1999.  Under this 
system, HMOs that contract with the state of California to coordinate medical care for Medicaid 
recipients are paid a fixed amount per recipient-month that varies across Medicaid eligibility categories. 
While the growth at the state level proceeded quite smoothly during this time period, there was 
substantial variation across local market areas in the pace of managed care penetration.  This variation 
was primarily driven by differences across counties in the timing of Medicaid managed care legislation.  
Beginning with Sacramento in April of 1994 and most recently with Monterey in October of 1999, certain 
categories of Medicaid recipients in the state of California were required to enroll in an HMO.  The 
groups affected by the mandates and the number of plans from which recipients could choose varied 
substantially across counties. 
 There are three approaches that California has employed to shift its Medicaid recipients into 
managed care plans.  In the first, which is referred to as Geographic Managed Care (GMC), the state 
government contracts with several commercial HMOs to coordinate care for Medicaid recipients.  Plans 
initially applied by submitting a menu of prices at which they would be willing to insure each type of 
Medicaid recipient.  The government then awarded contracts to the plans most likely to deliver high 
quality medical care at a low price, though the weight placed on quality and spending was not specified. 
The first county to switch its Medicaid recipients to managed care under this model was 
Sacramento, where AFDC recipients and some other Medicaid beneficiaries were required to enroll in a 
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plan beginning in April of 1994.  Those affected by the mandate accounted for nearly 70% of Medicaid 
recipients but a smaller percentage of program spending.  Aged, blind, and disabled individuals eligible 
for Medicaid through the Supplemental Security Income (SSI) program were not required to join an HMO 
but had the option to do so, while a small share of recipients (e.g. non-resident aliens) were not allowed to 
enroll in a plan.  At the time of the mandate, approximately 8% of AFDC recipients were voluntarily 
enrolled in a managed care organization.  This share increased steadily during the next several months, 
but never reached 100% (see Figure 1).7  Despite this, the increase from less than 10% to more than 80% 
in just six months was quite a significant change. 
 As shown in Figure 2, an even sharper change in managed care penetration occurred in Solano, 
the first county to switch its recipients into a county-organized health system (COHS) during the time 
period of interest.8  Under this model, the not-for-profit, community-based HMO was reimbursed a fixed 
amount per recipient-month that varied by eligibility category.  In contrast to Sacramento, recipients did 
not have a choice of plan in COHS counties.  Additionally, the state government did not accept bids from 
commercial companies, instead deciding in advance to contract with one Medicaid-only HMO in each 
county.  In addition to AFDC recipients, SSI recipients and individuals in most other Medicaid eligibility 
categories were required to enroll in the managed care plan. 
 The final model of Medicaid managed care used in California involved competition between one 
commercial plan and one private not-for-profit, Medicaid-only HMO.  In these “Two-Plan” counties, the 
state solicited bids from private companies and awarded a contract to just one of the plans.  Alameda was 
the first county to switch its Medicaid recipients into managed care plans using this model.  The resulting 
increase in the fraction of recipients enrolled in an HMO was significant (see Figure 3), though a bit less 
rapid than the increase in Sacramento.  AFDC recipients were required to enroll in one of the two plan 
                                                 
7 There were three reasons for this.  First, it often took a few months for newly eligible Medicaid 
recipients to become enrolled in a plan.  Second, foster children receiving AFDC payments were not 
required to join a plan.  And third, a small percentage of recipients were given waivers from the mandates 
and allowed to remain in the fee-for-service system.   
8 Medicaid recipients in Santa Barbara and San Mateo were required to join a county-organized health system 
starting in 1983 and 1987, respectively.  I select Solano as the first because my data do not begin until 1993. 
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while SSI recipients and most other Medicaid beneficiaries had the option to join a plan.  Table 3 lists the 
counties that introduced Medicaid managed care mandates during the 1990s and the dates that each 
mandate was imposed.  The final column gives the fraction of AFDC recipients who were voluntarily 
enrolled in a Medicaid managed care plan in the month before the mandate took effect, which varied from 
a low of 0% to a high of more than 58% in San Diego. 
It is theoretically ambiguous which of these three models would be more likely to yield a 
favorable change in government spending and health outcomes relative to the fee-for-service system.  
Consider, for example, the effect of HMO contracting on government spending for a given level of 
quality.  If the most important difference between the plan types is market power in negotiating with 
health care providers, then one might expect to find higher spending in GMC and 2-plan counties.  
Alternatively, if the key distinction is the extent of competition in the bidding process for the HMO 
contracts, then one would find significantly higher spending in COHS counties (which did not have to 
compete to win the contract).  And finally, if the most important factor is the economies of scale in 
program administration, then one would expect to observe lower spending for a particular level of quality 
in COHS counties.  In the empirical work that follows, I explore which of these hypotheses seems to most 
accurately describe California’s experience with Medicaid HMOs from 1993 to 1999. 
3. Data and Empirical Framework 
A. Medicaid Spending and Health Outcomes Data 
Medicaid recipients enrolled in a managed care plan typically have no paid fee-for-service claims.  
It is therefore not surprising that the increase in managed care enrollment has coincided with a decline in 
the relative importance of fee-for-service payments in the Medicaid program.  In 1993, the $10.44 billion 
in fee-for-service expenditures accounted for 70% of total Medicaid spending (Table 2).  This fraction 
declined to 56% by 1999, with the corresponding share for capitation payments increasing from 4% to 
15%.  The first aim of this paper is to determine whether part of the slowdown in Medicaid spending 
during the last several years (from 16% annually in the 1989-93 period to less than 5% per year during the 
next six years) was caused by the increase in HMO enrollment. 
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To do this, I use individual-level expenditure data for a random 20% sample of Medicaid 
beneficiaries.  The California Department of Health Services (DHS) maintains a database that contains all 
fee-for-service payments made on behalf of each Medicaid recipient.  These claims include payments to 
hospitals, pharmacies, physicians, long-term care facilities, and other types of health care providers.  In a 
typical year, there are more than 150 million fee-for-service Medicaid claims in the state of California.  
Additionally, DHS tracks every recipient’s eligibility for the program in each month, and its eligibility 
file provides data on whether a recipient is enrolled in a managed care plan or is instead in the fee-for-
service system.  This eligibility data can be matched to another DHS data source that contains plan-
specific reimbursement rates by month and Medicaid eligibility category.  I use this information together 
with the fee-for-service claims to calculate individual-specific Medicaid spending for medical services 
received by the recipient in each six-month period from the first half of 1993 until the second half of 
1999.9  The 20% sample includes expenditure data for 2,535,459 individuals with at least one month of 
Medicaid eligibility between January of 1993 and December of 1999. 
Once a Medicaid recipient enters a managed care plan, the Medicaid claims data is no longer 
informative about his health care utilization.  It is therefore not possible to identify the effects of HMO 
enrollment on health care quality without a different source of data.  In my analysis of health outcomes, I 
utilize California’s hospital discharge data,10 which contains detailed information about every hospital 
discharge in the state during the time period of interest.  Though I am unable to link a specific hospital 
patient with a particular Medicaid recipient, I can investigate whether average health outcomes for 
                                                 
9 This expenditure data will miss some of the spending categories listed in Table 2.  For example, I do not have 
individual-specific DSH payments, though county-level expenditure specifications that included this information 
suggest that DSH payments were not significantly affected by the shift to HMOs (Duggan, 2002).  Additionally, my 
expenditure data do not include miscellaneous non-FFS spending nor Medicare buy-ins, but these are paid almost 
exclusively on behalf of SSI recipients and thus would essentially be zero for the AFDC recipients in my sample.  
Also, dental payments are not included in my data but these were “carved out” of all managed care contracts and 
thus should not have been affected.  The absence of data on administrative costs is potentially problematic.  
Conversations with state Medicaid officials suggest that the shift to managed care has, if anything, increased the 
state’s costs of administering the program, because the number of state employees in the fee-for-service branch has 
not fallen while a new state agency was created to administer the managed care contracts.  The fact that 
administrative costs rose by more than 7% per year from 1993 to 1999 is consistent with this. 
10 See Duggan (2000) for a detailed description of the California’s hospital discharge data. 
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Medicaid recipients changed in a county following the passage of a managed care mandate there. The 
specific outcomes used are described below. 
B. Empirical Framework 
In the empirical work that follows, I use the presence of a county managed care mandate as an 
instrumental variable to estimate the average effect of switching a Medicaid recipient from fee-for-service 
into an HMO.  The identifying assumption of this empirical approach is that the mandate is related to 
government spending and health outcomes only through an effect on HMO enrollment.  This assumption 
would be violated if, for example, counties introduced managed care mandates in response to changes in 
Medicaid spending or because of changes in the characteristics of their Medicaid recipients.  Because the 
date of each mandate was chosen far in advance by state Medicaid officials,11 this type of endogeneity 
seems unlikely to have been present.12 
 While the introduction of the mandates were unlikely to have been affected by changes in a 
county’s Medicaid spending or in the characteristics of its recipients, it is worth pointing out that the 
counties selected for the mandates are not a random sample of California’s 58 counties, but are instead 
disproportionately large (e.g. 18 of the 20 most populous counties have a mandate while only 3 of the 
remaining 38 do) and more urban than the average county in this state.  Similarly, the type of managed 
care chosen in each county may not have been purely random.  For example, the COHS model was more 
likely to be adopted in counties with a less competitive HMO industry. 
                                                 
11 State legislation passed in 1991 and 1992 made possible the substantial expansion of Medicaid managed care 
examined in this paper.   The GMC model and the April 1994 date was chosen in early 1992 for Sacaramento, the 
first county to move to mandatory Medicaid managed care after the passage of this legislation.   At about this same 
time, twelve counties were selected for the 2-plan model, five for the COHS model, and one other (San Diego) for 
GMC (DHS, 1998).  Thus all of the mandate counties, their types of managed care, and the approximate dates of the 
mandates were selected more than two years before any mandate took effect (California DHS, 1998).  
12 Recognizing the potential benefits of learning-by-doing, the state Medicaid agency started slowly with the shift to 
HMOs.  Sacramento and Solano were selected first at least partially because they were smaller counties and thus the 
shift would be less complicated than in some of the later counties (e.g. Los Angeles).  Seventeen months elapsed 
between the second and third mandates (Solano and Orange), but during the subsequent seventeen months an 
additional eleven counties required their recipients to enroll in a plan. 
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But as long as this non-random assignment of mandates and plan types to counties can be 
controlled for by including individual fixed effects13 and county-specific time trends, it will not bias the 
estimates from specifications of the following type: 
jktktjjktktjkt tXMandateManCare 1111111 **)1( ερλθµγα ++++++=  
jktktjjktktjkt tXMandateSpending 2222222 **)2( ερλθµγα ++++++=  
with j, k, and t indexing individuals, counties and years, respectively.  In these individual-level 
regressions, the Mandatek,t variable is equal to the fraction of individual j’s eligible months in period t 
with a mandate in effect.  I index this by k rather than j because the policy is varying at the county and not 
at the individual level.  ManCarejkt is equal to the fraction of j’s eligible months in which she is actually 
enrolled in an HMO while Spendingjkt is simply Medicaid spending for individual j in period t. 
The inclusion of the individual specific fixed effects implies that the parameters γ1 and γ2 are 
essentially being estimated by  “switchers” – individuals who were in fee-for-service but then switched to 
managed care as a result of the mandates.  The IV estimate of the effect of managed care enrollment on 
Medicaid spending is simply the ratio γ2 / γ1.  I will employ a similar strategy to estimate the effect of the 
shift from fee-for-service to HMOs on health outcomes, though for the reasons mentioned above I will 
use county averages for Medicaid recipients in this part of the analysis. 
4. The Effect of HMO Enrollment on Medicaid Spending 
In this section, I utilize individual level Medicaid expenditure data to investigate whether 
government spending changed significantly following the shift of program participants into HMOs. From 
January of 1993 to December of 1999, the fraction of California’s Medicaid recipients enrolled in an 
HMO increased from 13% to 51%.  As Figure 4 demonstrates, the increase was even greater for AFDC 
recipients, who were required to enroll in an HMO in each of the 21 counties with a managed care 
mandate.   While just 20% of welfare recipients in mandate counties were enrolled in an HMO in January 
                                                 
13 County fixed effects are essentially included because I have individual fixed effects and less than 10% of the 
sample moves from one county to another in my sample. 
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of 1993, nearly 85% were by December of 1999.  During this same time period, HMO enrollment among 
welfare recipients in the other 37 counties remained at just 1%. 
Because AFDC recipients were differentially affected by the managed care mandates, I focus my 
empirical work on individuals eligible for Medicaid only through this program.14  Of the 2,535,459 
individuals with at least one month of Medicaid eligibility between 1993 and 1999, my initial sample 
consists of 1,208,648 welfare recipients.15  After excluding the 9445 individuals with data inconsistencies 
across years (i.e. male in 1993 but female in 1995) I am left with a sample of 1,199,203 Medicaid 
recipients.  
An important feature of the Medicaid program is that spell lengths are often quite short and vary 
substantially across individuals.  Figure 5 shows the distribution of the number of Medicaid eligible 
months in my sample.  More than 25% of the welfare recipients in the sample have 10 or fewer months of 
Medicaid eligibility and more than half have less than 30 months.  There is a “spike” at 84 months of 
eligibility – for most of these individuals their spell is both right and left-censored.  Additionally, some 
individuals in the sample have a break in eligibility, with 26% having two or more distinct spells during 
the 84 month time period. 
 For each individual, I calculate total Medicaid spending in each six-month period from the 
beginning of 1993 until the end of 1999.  Payments are assigned to time periods based on when the 
service was delivered rather than when the payments were disbursed.  Medicaid spending includes fee-
for-service payments to hospitals, physicians, and other health care providers and capitation payments to 
HMOs.  The maximum number of observations for each person is 14, though just 18% of the sample is 
eligible for Medicaid in every period (Table 5).  The total number of observations in the panel data set is 
                                                 
14 One limitation to focusing on AFDC recipients only is that the shift to managed care may influence utilization by 
individuals who remain covered by the fee-for-service system.  See Baker (1998) for an investigation of the effect of 
Medicare managed care on the treatment of those who remain in fee-for-service. 
15 Of the remaining 1.34 million people in the twenty percent sample, 73% have exactly zero months of 
eligibility through AFDC with the remaining 27% having some – but not all – of their Medicaid eligibility 
months due to welfare receipt.   
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equal to 8.15 million, which implies that the average number of observations for each individual in the 
sample is equal to 6.8. 
Summary statistics for individuals in the sample are provided in Table 6.  As is clear from this 
table, approximately 65% of the AFDC recipients in the sample are under the age of 18.  This makes 
sense given that there are approximately twice as many children as adults on the AFDC program.  Almost 
three out of every four adult recipients in the sample are female and virtually all of the adult recipients are 
under the age of 40.   More than 58% of the Medicaid recipients in the sample are black or Hispanic, with 
the remaining 42% consisting primarily of white and Asian individuals. 
 Average spending for those in the sample in each six month time period is equal to $418 (in 1999 
dollars).  This is much lower than spending for the average Medicaid recipient in California because SSI 
recipients and other eligibility categories are not included in my sample and are substantially more 
expensive on average.  For example, spending for the average aged, blind, and disabled recipient of the 
SSI program was more than six times as large as spending for the average AFDC recipient at the 
beginning of the sample period (Duggan, 2002).  
 The variable % Mandated is equal to the percentage of the recipient’s eligible months in the six-
month period in which a mandate is in effect.  The mean of this variable (.382) is approximately equal to 
the average value of the % Managed Care variable (.377), which is equal to the percentage of eligible 
months in which the recipient is actually enrolled in a plan.  It is worth pointing out, however, that the 
two do not move in lock step.  For example in 1993 the % Managed Care variable has a substantially 
higher mean than % Mandated (.188 vs. .014) while in 1999 the opposite is true (.745 vs. .892).  
 The empirical results provided in Table 7 summarize the results from specifications analogous to 
(1) above.  In these regressions, the dependent variable is equal to the fraction of the recipient’s eligible 
months in which he is actually enrolled in an HMO, while the key explanatory variable of interest is the 
percentage of these eligible months in which he is required to be in an HMO because of a Medicaid 
mandate in his county of residence.  In these regressions, there are 14 time dummies for each of the six-
month periods and 1,199,203 individual-specific fixed effects.  The standard errors are corrected to 
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account both for the fact that the policy varies only at the county-time (rather than at the individual) level 
and for serial correlation in the error term.    
The key identifying assumption in these regressions is that the mandate is related to Medicaid 
spending only through an effect on HMO enrollment. This assumption would be violated if, for example, 
the timing of the mandate in county j were systematically related to changes in spending that would have 
occurred in this county, relative to the rest of the state, in the absence of the mandate.  It is not possible to 
rule out this type of legislative endogeneity, though because the date of each mandate varied substantially 
across counties and was chosen far in advance by the state government, this seems like a reasonable 
assumption.  Furthermore, fee-for-service reimbursement rates for many providers, including physicians 
and pharmacies, were set at the state, and not at the provider level.  This uniformity across market areas 
limits the potential for policy-makers in the state government to have forecasted when expenditures would 
increase in a specific county relative to the rest of California. 
The significantly positive coefficient estimate of 0.410 in the first column of Table 7 implies that 
the relationship between the managed care mandates and Medicaid HMO enrollment is not one-for-one.  
There are three principal reasons for this.  First, in many counties a large fraction of welfare recipients 
were voluntarily enrolled in a plan just prior to the mandate (see Table 3).   These recipients would 
experience no change in HMO enrollment (though their plans might change) following the mandate.  
Second, in many cases the full effect of the mandate does not occur immediately.  And third, even after a 
mandate has been in effect for several months, it is often the case that some welfare recipients remain in 
the fee-for-service system for the reasons described in Section 2 above.  Despite this, this first estimate 
clearly demonstrates that the introduction of the HMO mandates led to a sharp and significant increase in 
Medicaid HMO enrollment among the AFDC population. 
In the second specification I interact the % Mandated variable with an indicator that is equal to 
one if the person was voluntarily enrolled in a plan in the month before the mandate took effect and zero 
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otherwise.16  As one would expect, the coefficient estimate for this variable is significantly negative, 
suggesting that the mandates had a much smaller effect on those already enrolled in a plan than their 
counterparts who were in the fee-for-service system.  Similarly, both the magnitude and the statistical 
significance of the coefficient estimate for % Mandated increase substantially.  In specifications three and 
four I include county-specific time trends.  This reduces the magnitude of both estimates for the % 
Mandated coefficient but both remain statistically significant with t-statistics of approximately 4. 
In Table 8 I use % Mandated as an instrumental variable for the % Managed Care variable.  Thus 
the estimate of for the % Managed Care coefficient in specification (1) is analogous to the γ2 / γ1 ratio 
described in section three above.    The statistically significant coefficient estimate of 69.5 suggests that 
the shift from fee-for-service to managed care that resulted from the HMO mandates was associated with 
a 17% increase in Medicaid spending.   This estimate and its statistical precision increases substantially 
once I control in the second specification for whether the person was voluntarily enrolled in the month 
before the passage of the mandate.  The statistically significant estimate of 97.0 suggests that the average 
effect of the shift from fee-for-service to managed care was a 23% increase in total Medicaid spending.17 
One potential concern with this first set of results is that the counties that shifted their Medicaid 
recipients into HMOs may have had different expenditure trends than their counterparts that retained the 
fee-for-service system.  If this were true, then the first set of results could provide an inaccurate measure 
of the effect of the mandates even with the inclusion of time and individual-specific fixed effects.  Thus in 
the next two specifications I introduce county-specific time trends.  In both cases, my estimates for the 
effect of HMO enrollment on Medicaid spending increases, suggesting that the first set of results is not 
driven by differences across local market area in Medicaid expenditure trends. 
                                                 
16 I do not include this main effect separately because it would be perfectly collinear with the individual fixed effect.  
The Voluntary variable is equal to one for the entire 1993 to 1999 time period for individuals who were voluntarily 
enrolled in the month before the mandate took effect in their county – thus it does not vary within a person. 
17 It appears that the magnitude of this expenditure increase is similar across racial/ethnic groups.  For example, I 
estimated separate specifications similar to (1) for Hispanics, blacks, and all other recipients and obtained point 
estimates of 91.9, 96.1, and 73.4, respectively. 
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These first four specifications assume that the effect of the mandate does not vary over time.  One 
possible explanation for the sharp increase in Medicaid spending that is implied by my estimates is that 
the reorganization of the Medicaid program is very costly in the short term but that subsequently costs 
decline.  To test for the presence of this effect, I include a variable Periods with Mandate that is equal to t 
if a mandate was implemented in the recipient’s county t periods ago and zero otherwise.   This allows me 
to differentiate between a level and trend effect of the mandates.  Consistent with this hypothesis, the 
estimates for the Periods with Mandate variable are negative, though both are insignificant and small in 
magnitude.  This suggests that the significant increase in Medicaid spending persists over time, though 
there may be a modest decline in the magnitude of this effect after a few years. 
Taken together, the results presented in Table 8 strongly suggest that shifting AFDC recipients 
from fee-for-service into HMOs has increased California’s Medicaid spending above what it otherwise 
would have been.   One remaining concern with these estimates is that Medicaid-eligible individuals 
might choose not to enroll in the program or move to a different county in the state in response to a 
managed care mandate.18  Thus the composition of individuals in the sample would be changing as the 
mandates took effect.  To explore this possibility in specifications not summarized here I estimated the 
relationship between the number of AFDC-eligible Medicaid recipients in a county and the % Mandated 
variable.  My findings there suggested that there was no significant change in the number of Medicaid 
eligibles nor in the fraction of recipients who were black or of Hispanic origin.  Additionally, when I 
estimated specifications similar to those above and restricted the sample to individuals who lived in the 
same county throughout the time period the estimates were virtually unchanged.19  And finally, because I 
include time effects, individual fixed effects, and county-specific time trends in my specifications, I am 
essentially obtaining my estimates from within-person changes in Medicaid spending.  Thus changes in 
the composition of Medicaid recipients in mandate counties should not drive the results. 
                                                 
18 See Currie and Fahr (2002) for evidence suggesting that Medicaid managed care may influence enrollment in the 
program, and that this effect is especially strong for certain minority groups. 
19 Approximately 10% of the sample had two or more counties of residence while eligible for Medicaid between 
January of 1993 and December of 1999. 
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 In Table 9 I investigate whether the magnitude of the Medicaid expenditure effect did vary 
systematically across the different types of managed care mandates.  Because there are only two GMC 
counties, I group them with the twelve 2-plan counties, as both of these models allow recipients a choice 
of plan whereas COHS counties do not.  I instrument for managed care enrollment in each type of county 
using the two variables % COHS Mandated and % 2-plan/GMC Mandated.  The sum of these two 
variables is equal to the % Mandated variable defined above, with the first one equal to % Mandated for 
the seven COHS counties and the second equal to % Mandated for the other fourteen counties with a 
mandate.  Specifications (1) through (6) in Table 9 are analogous to those summarized in Table 8, with 
the first two including individual and time fixed effects, the second two introducing county-specific time 
trends, and the last two including the Periods with Mandate variable. 
 All six specifications point to the same conclusion – that the average expenditure increase was 
greater in COHS counties than it was in the 2-plan and GMC counties. 20  This is consistent with just one 
of the three hypotheses outlined above – that the competition in the bidding for managed care contracts 
kept costs relatively low.  It is not consistent with the market power hypothesis, which suggested that 
COHS plans should be able to spend less because they would have more market power than their 2-plan 
and GMC counterparts when negotiating with health care providers.   Nor is it consistent with the 
administrative costs hypothesis, which predicted a larger expenditure increase in counties that contracted 
with relatively more plans because of economies of scale in plan administration. 
 And despite the significant difference across plan types, the results presented in Table 9 
demonstrate that both were associated with significant increases in government spending.   This 
undermines the hypothesis that California’s shift to Medicaid managed care saved the state money.  If 
anything, it appears that Medicaid spending is significantly higher than it otherwise would have been.  
                                                 
20 Anecdotal evidence for the largest COHS plan (Cal Optima in Orange County) suggests that Medicaid 
spending increased both because the plan paid providers substantially more than they had previously 
received to treat Medicaid patients and because net income was a significant fraction of total capitation 
revenue for the state.  Specifically, the plan pointed out in a recent annual report that its physicians 
“receive 140 percent of the Medicaid fee schedule” (Cal Optima, 2000).   This same document revealed 
that the plan earned net income of $35 million on capitation revenues of $570 million. 
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Thus although managed care may have succeeded in reducing health care spending in the private sector 
(Cutler, McClellan, Newhouse, 2000), my findings suggest that the opposite is true in the public sector. 
While the results presented in this section cast considerable doubt on the hypothesis that managed 
care is responsible for the slowdown in Medicaid expenditure growth in the nation’s most populous state, 
it says relatively little about the efficiency of the shift.  In the next section, I explore whether the increase 
in HMO enrollment was associated with an observable improvement in health care quality, and then 
assess the efficiency effects of Medicaid HMO contracting. 
5. The Effect of HMO Enrollment on Health Outcomes 
In this section, I investigate whether the growth in HMO enrollment caused by the Medicaid 
managed care mandates led to an improvement in health outcomes for the poor.  The claims data 
described above have detailed information about each recipient’s health care utilization while in the fee-
for-service system, but do not have comparable information once an individual enrolls in an HMO.  
Because individuals essentially disappear from the claims data once they enroll in an HMO, I use a 
different data source that provides similar data for Medicaid recipients whether they are in a managed 
care plan or not.  Specifically, I use hospital discharge data for the 1993 to 1999 period and focus on those 
patients with Medicaid as their source of insurance.   
I am unfortunately unable to link individual-level outcomes data with my Medicaid claims 
information, and therefore must aggregate outcome measures for Medicaid-eligible individuals to the 
county level.21   One consequence of this is that I am unable to restrict the sample to welfare recipients 
only – the hospital discharge data provide an individual’s source of insurance but do not tell whether an 
individual is eligible for Medicaid through AFDC, SSI, or some other program.  Additionally, hospital 
discharge data will contain information on in-hospital health outcomes only – if for example a Medicaid-
insured infant were to die outside of the hospital then this would not be observed in my data.  And finally, 
measuring health is inherently more difficult than doing the same for Medicaid spending.  There are many 
                                                 
21 The state of California is currently constructing a data set that will enable researchers to perform this individual-
level link, but it is not yet available and will not cover the pre-mandate period in any of the 21 counties of interest.  
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dimensions of health – some observed and some unobserved – and thus any examination of health 
outcomes is likely to be to some extent incomplete.   Thus the results presented in this section should be 
interpreted with more caution than the analogous results presented above for Medicaid spending. 
Following the recent literature that examines the effect of managed care enrollment on the health 
of Medicaid recipients (Levinson and Ullman, 1998; Kaester, Dubay, and Kenney, 2002), I focus on 
infant health outcomes.  While this is by no means a perfect measure of the change in health associated 
with the shift to HMOs, it has the advantage that virtually every Medicaid-insured birth occurs in the 
hospital and thus will appear in my hospital discharge data.  A change in, for example, the avoidable 
hospitalization rate among Medicaid-insured individuals could simply reflect a change in where the 
treatment is delivered rather than in true health.  
  From 1993 to 1999, there were 3.73 million births delivered in California’s general acute care 
hospitals, with approximately 45% of these births insured by the Medicaid program.  For each six-month 
period between early 1993 and late 1999, I use the hospital discharge data to calculate the in-hospital 
mortality rate for Medicaid-insured infants in each county and the fraction of these newborns born 
premature.22  I also calculate the fraction of each county’s infants that are insured by Medicaid in each 
period to explore whether the passage of the mandates was associated with a change in Medicaid 
coverage.  And finally, I use the average length-of-stay among Medicaid-insured infants to investigate 
whether managed care plans reduce health care utilization relative to the fee-for-service system. 
The results presented in Table 10 shed light on the effect of the mandates on Medicaid coverage, 
health care utilization, and infant health.  Each cell in the second and third columns provides the 
coefficient estimate from a different specification in which the explanatory variable of interest is equal to 
the fraction of months in the period that a county had a managed care mandate in effect.  All of the 
specifications include 14 time and 58 county fixed effects, with the specifications summarized in the third 
column also including 58 county-specific time trends. 
                                                 
22 The Medicaid eligibility data suggests that the fraction of Medicaid-eligible infants that are eligible through 
welfare receipt declines during this period, from 72% in 1993 to 58% by 1999.  In specifications not summarized 
here I find that this decline does not appear to be related to the passage of managed care mandates. 
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The set of results summarized in the first row suggests that the passage of the mandates was 
associated with a modest, though statistically significant decline in the fraction of infants insured by the 
Medicaid program.  The point estimates of -.0192 and -.0215 in the second and third columns, 
respectively, suggests that the fraction of Medicaid-insured births fell by approximately 2 percentage 
points.  This result is consistent with the findings of recent work that suggests the shift to Medicaid 
managed care reduced enrollment in this program for certain groups (Currie-Fahr, 2002), though because 
the implied effect is just 2% (from a mean of 45%) it is unlikely to be sufficiently large to cause 
composition bias in the subsequent specifications.23 
In the second and third rows I summarize the results from specifications that explore the effect of 
the managed care mandates on the fraction of Medicaid infants that are born premature and the fraction 
that die in the hospital.24  All four of the coefficient estimates of estimate are statistically insignificant, 
suggesting that the shift to HMOs did not lead to a substantial improvement in infant health.  Similarly, 
the estimates for the Medicaid-insured infant mortality rate are similar in sign and magnitude to the 
estimates for non-Medicaid births, which presumably would be unaffected by the Medicaid mandates.   
In a companion set of specifications not summarized here, I explore whether the average effect of 
the mandates in COHS counties was significantly different from the corresponding effect in two-plan and 
GMC counties.  My findings there suggest that the shift to HMOs did not lead to significant 
improvements in Medicaid infant health in either type of county.  This suggests that neither the stronger 
financial incentive that COHS counties have to keep their recipients healthy nor the incentive that GMC 
and 2-plan counties have to avoid unprofitable (and perhaps unhealthy) customers has a significant effect 
on health care quality. 
In the final row I examine the relationship between health care utilization and the average number 
of days that Medicaid-insured infants stay in the hospital.  If fee-for-service reimbursement leads to 
                                                 
23 In separate specifications not summarized here I explore whether the percentage of Medicaid-insured infants that 
are black or of Hispanic origin is significantly related to the mandate variable.  My findings suggest that Medicaid 
enrollment did not decline differentially for these two groups. 
24 More than 75% of infant deaths in the state of California occur in the hospital. 
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excessive utilization, then one would expect to find a significant decline given the HMOs’ financial 
incentives to reduce payments to hospitals and other health care providers.  But the statistically 
insignificant estimates for the mandate variable suggest that HMOs have not reduced utilization for 
Medicaid-eligible infants. 
Taken together, the results presented in this section suggest that shifting Medicaid recipients from 
fee-for-service into managed care has not improved infant health.  While there are no doubt other 
dimensions of health that could have been affected, this is the one that can be most accurately measured 
with the available data and is arguably the most important one for the AFDC population. 
6. Discussion 
During the 1990s, the fraction of Medicaid recipients in the state of California enrolled in HMOs 
increased from less than 12% to more than 51%.  The results presented in this paper demonstrate that the 
increased reliance on HMOs led to a substantial increase in government spending and suggest that health 
outcomes for the poor did not improve.  It therefore appears that requiring millions of California’s 
Medicaid recipients to switch out of the fee-for-service system and enroll in HMOs did not lead to an 
improvement in the efficiency of this government program. 
Do the results for welfare recipients generalize to other Medicaid beneficiaries or to Medicaid 
programs in other states?  Because the mandates differentially affected low cost Medicaid recipients, it is 
certainly possible that the impact for more expensive program participants with a different set of health 
conditions would not be similar.  Additionally, fee-for-service Medicaid reimbursement rates in 
California are lower than those in the typical state.  Thus it is possible that there is a greater chance of 
reducing government spending while simultaneously improving quality by contracting with HMOs in 
other state Medicaid programs. 
But if policy makers chose not to require other Medicaid recipients (e.g. the aged, blind, and 
disabled receiving SSI) to enroll in a plan because they accurately forecasted that the efficiency effects for 
these other groups would be less favorable, then the results presented here may understate the extent to 
which HMO contracting would reduce program efficiency.  Furthermore, because California’s HMO 
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market is the most mature in the nation, the managed care organizations in this state are presumably more 
efficient than the typical HMO.  It is therefore ambiguous whether Medicaid HMO contracting would be 
more or less efficient in other states.  
For two reasons, one may expect HMO contracting to be even less effective in the Medicare 
program.  First, because recipients of this program have the option both to enroll in and to drop out of an 
HMO, managed care organizations may find it more profitable to select healthy enrollees (conditional on 
observable characteristics) rather than to improve health.  Second, the extent of demand-side cost sharing 
is much greater for fee-for-service recipients of this program than for their counterparts in Medicaid.  
Thus the fraction of expenditures that have little value to the beneficiary is likely to be lower in Medicare. 
 The projected increases in public medical spending along with the deteriorating health of federal 
and state budgets may increase policy maker interest in contracting with HMOs.  The results presented in 
this paper suggest that private managed care plans are unlikely to deliver cost savings to federal and state 
governments without reducing health care quality for Medicare and Medicaid recipients. 
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Figure 1: Sacramento TANF Medicaid Recipients
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Figure 2: Solano TANF Medicaid Recipients
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Figure 3: Alameda TANF Medicaid Recipients
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Figure 4: California TANF Medicaid Recipients
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Figure 5: Months of Medicaid Eligibility 1993-99
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
16
4 16 28 40 52 64 76
Months (x = x-3 to x months)
Pe
rc
en
ta
ge
 o
f r
ec
ip
ie
nt
s
 
 28
Table 1: Medicaid Managed Care Penetration Rates 1991-2000 
U.S. Medicaid California Medicaid  
Year # Recipients % Man. Care # Recipients % Man. Care 
1991 28.3 9.5% 4.02 11.7% 
1992 30.9 11.8% 4.49 12.5% 
1993 33.4 14.4% 4.83 14.1% 
1994 33.6 23.2% 5.01 16.3% 
1995 33.4 29.4% 5.02 23.5% 
1996 33.2 40.1% 5.11 23.1% 
1997 32.1 47.8% 4.79 38.7% 
1998 30.9 53.6% 4.90 45.8% 
1999 31.9 55.6% 4.97 51.1% 
2000 33.7 55.8% 5.04 50.1% 
Data were obtained from HCFA publications and from www.hcfa.gov 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2: California Medicaid Expenditures in 1989, 1993, and 1999 
Category of Spending 1988-89 1992-93 1998-1999 
FFS Provider Payments 6939 10439 11140 
Capitation Payments 477 667 2962 
Disproportionate Share Hospital 0 2054 2154 
Miscellaneous non-FFS 94 280 1108 
Administration 297 633 971 
Medicare Buy-In 273 414 827 
Dental 147* 479 689 
Other and Recoveries -19 9 -80 
Total $8208 $14973 $19769 
Per California State Resident $281 $480 $601 
Values are in millions of 1999 dollars. 
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Table 3: Type and Date of Managed Care Mandate by County 
County Type of Mandate Date of Mandate Pre-Mandate % MC 
Santa Barbara COHS 9/83 - 
San Mateo COHS 12/87 - 
Sacramento GMC 4/94 8.5% 
Solano COHS 5/94 1.4% 
Orange COHS 10/95 22.3% 
Alameda Two-Plan 1/96 4.6% 
Santa Cruz COHS 1/96 0.0% 
San Joaquin Two-Plan 2/96 0.9% 
Kern Two-Plan 7/96 0.0% 
San Francisco Two-Plan 7/96 14.1% 
Riverside Two-Plan 9/96 30.3% 
San Bernardino Two-Plan 9/96 30.2% 
Santa Clara Two-Plan 10/96 4.1% 
Fresno Two-Plan 11/96 4.3% 
Contra Costa Two-Plan 2/97 22.6% 
Stanislaus Two-Plan 2/97 0.0% 
Los Angeles Two-Plan 4/97 39.0% 
Napa COHS 3/98 0.0% 
San Diego GMC 7/98 58.3% 
Tulare Two-Plan 2/99 0.0% 
Monterey COHS 10/99 0.0% 
Includes date of Medicaid managed care mandate for the 21 counties with a 
mandate by the end of 1999.  Pre-Mandate %MC is equal to the percentage of 
welfare recipients who were voluntarily enrolled in a managed care plan in the 
month before the mandate took effect. 
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Table 4: Change in Managed Care Penetration Resulting from Mandates 
AFDC All Other  
Type of Plan 1/93 12/99 1/93 12/99 
COHS 28% 
(n=54,321) 
95% 
(n=43,876) 
18% 
(n=42,962) 
81% 
(n=45,432) 
Two-Plan 19% 
(n=430,009) 
81% 
(n=414,532) 
3% 
(n=252,121) 
14% 
(n=287,737) 
GMC 19% 
(n=75,061) 
87% 
(n=66,342) 
4% 
(n=35,729) 
15% 
(n=40,280) 
Other 37 1% 
(n=72,639) 
1% 
(n=60,955) 
0% 
(n=40,865) 
0% 
(n=45,615) 
Total 18% 
(n=632,030) 
74% 
(n=585,705) 
5% 
(n=371,677) 
20% 
(n=419,064) 
AFDC category includes recipients who are receiving welfare (AFDC or CalWorks, 
depending on the year) payments, through section 1931b of Title XIX, or were 
discontinued from welfare but are still eligible because of the Edwards versus Kizer court 
order.  Some welfare recipients are eligible only through the state (and not the federal) 
program.  All Other category includes all other Medicaid recipients. 
 
 
 
 
Table 5: # of Observations for Welfare Recipients in the Sample 
# Observations # Recipients % of Total 
1 152,247 12.7% 
2 159,618 13.3% 
3 113,590 9.5% 
4 85,435 7.1% 
5 75,975 6.3% 
6 67,170 5.6% 
7 56,907 4.8% 
8 53,707 4.5% 
9 51,352 4.3% 
10 48,886 4.1% 
11 41,070 3.4% 
12 39,954 3.3% 
13 42,132 3.5% 
14 211,160 17.6% 
Total 1,199,203 100.0% 
Number of half-year observations for each of the 1,199,203 individuals 
in the AFDC sample.  # Observations = t row lists the number of 
individuals in the sample who have t half-year periods with at least one 
month of Medicaid eligibility. 
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Table 6: Summary Statistics for Medicaid Sample 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. 
% Female 0-4 .106 .307 
% Male 0-4 .108 .311 
% Female 5-17 .213 .409 
% Male 5-17 .217 .412 
% Female 18-39 .201 .400 
% Male 18-39 .071 .257 
% Female 40+ .026 .026 
% Male 40+ .016 .126 
% Hispanic .395 .489 
% Black .180 .384 
% Asian .115 .319 
% White .303 .460 
Medicaid Spending 418 1663 
% Managed Care .377 .465 
% Mandated .382 .474 
% Mandated * Voluntary .070 .249 
Eligible Months 5.4 1.3 
% COHS Mandated .048 .210 
% Two-Plan, GMC Mandated .334 .461 
Periods with Mandate 1.22 2.15 
Number of observations is 8,151,095 for all variables. 
 
 
 
Table 7: The Effect of Medicaid Mandates on Managed Care Enrollment 
% Eligible Months in Managed Care  
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
% Mandated .410*** 
[.083] 
.486*** 
[.084] 
.354*** 
[.094] 
.418*** 
[.093] 
% Mandated * Voluntary  -.304*** 
[.062] 
 
 
-0.253*** 
[..050] 
Eligible Months .038*** 
[.006] 
.039*** 
[.006] 
.039*** 
[.006] 
.039*** 
[.006] 
# Observations 8,151,095 8,151,095 8,151,095 8,151,095 
R-squared .699 .710 .714 .721 
Person & Time Effects? Yes Yes Yes Yes 
County trends? No No Yes Yes 
Dependent variable is equal to the fraction of Medicaid eligible months in the six-month period during 
which the recipient is enrolled in a managed care plan.  Each regression includes individual fixed effects 
and 14 year*half effects.  Specifications (3) and (4) also include county-specific time trends.  Standard 
errors are clustered by county to account both for the fact that % Mandated essentially varies only by 
county-period and for serial correlation in the error term. Regressions are weighted by the number of 
eligible months for the individual in the year. 
 
 32
 
Table 8: IV Estimates of the Effect of Managed Care Enrollment on Medicaid Spending 
Medicaid Spending for Individual j in Period t  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
% Managed Care 69.5* 
[42.1] 
97.0*** 
[29.9] 
94.3** 
[45.6] 
111.1*** 
[32.5] 
94.6** 
[47.4] 
112.0*** 
[33.5] 
% Mandated * 
Voluntary 
 -44.8** 
[21.3] 
 -23.7 
[26.0] 
 -23.9 
[26.9] 
Eligible Months  79.0*** 
[1.9] 
 78.0*** 
[1.6] 
 78.3*** 
[2.0] 
 77.6*** 
[1.7] 
78.3*** 
[2.0] 
77.6*** 
[1.7] 
Periods with Mandate     -1.6 
[6.3] 
-3.9 
[6.7] 
# Observations 8,151,095 8,151,095 8,151,095 8,151,095 8,151,095 8,151,095 
Person & Time Effects? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
County Trends? No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
First stage estimate .410 [.083] .486 [.084] .354 [.094] .418 [.093] .347 [.091] .408 [.091]
Dependent variable is equal to total Medicaid spending for the individual in period t.  Each regression 
includes individual fixed effects and 14 year*half effects.  Specifications (3) through (6) also include 
county-specific time trends.  Standard errors are clustered by county to account both for the fact that % 
Mandated essentially varies only by county-period and for serial correlation in the error term. Regressions 
are weighted by the number of eligible months for the individual in the year. 
 
 
 
 Table 8: IV Estimates of Effect of Managed Care Enrollment on Medicaid Spending by Plan Type 
Medicaid Spending for Individual j in Year t  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
% Managed Care in 
COHS Counties 
133.0*** 
[25.9] 
146.6*** 
[21.2] 
186.2*** 
[45.3] 
188.4*** 
[42.4] 
185.4*** 
[44.2] 
191.0*** 
[40.9] 
% Managed Care in  
2-Plan, GMC Counties 
52.7 
[42.7] 
84.0*** 
[29.2] 
51.5 
[48.0] 
78.8*** 
[28.9] 
51.7 
[49.1] 
78.4*** 
[29.2] 
% Mandated * 
Voluntary 
 -45.2** 
[20.8] 
 -26.7 
[26.5] 
  
Eligible Months 79.7 
[2.1] 
78.5*** 
[1.8] 
79.9*** 
[2.5] 
78.8*** 
[2.0] 
79.9*** 
[2.5] 
78.9*** 
[2.0] 
Periods with Mandate     0.6 
[5.3] 
-2.3 
[6.0] 
# Observations 8,151,095 8,151,095 8,151,095 8,151,095 8,151,095 8,151,095 
Person & Time Effects? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
County Trends? No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Dependent variable is equal to total Medicaid spending for the individual in period t.  Two instruments 
are used to predict the two managed care variables – (% Mandated * COHS county) and (% Mandated * 
2-plan / GMC county).  Each regression includes individual fixed effects and 14 year*half effects.  
Specifications (3) through (6) also include county-specific time trends.  Standard errors are clustered by 
county to account both for the fact that % Mandated essentially varies only by county-period and for 
serial correlation in the error term. Regressions are weighted by the number of eligible months for the 
individual in the year. 
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Table 10: The Effect of California’s Medicaid Managed Care Mandates on Infant Health Outcomes 
Dependent Variable No County Trends With County Trends µ,σ of Dep. Var. 
% of Births Medicaid-Insured -.0192*** [.0054] -.0215*** [.0060] .446 [.104] 
% Medicaid Births Premature .00081 [.00144] .00012 [.00112] .0697 [.0099] 
In-Hospital Medicaid IMR -.00019 [.00027] -.00001 [.00027] .0050 [.0017] 
In-Hospital Other IMR -.00014 [.00020] -.00035 [.00019] .0043 [.0015] 
Average Medicaid Birth LOS -.018 [.046] .018 [.040] 2.75 [0.32] 
Each cell in the second and third columns contains the coefficient estimate from a different regression of 
with the explanatory variable equal to the percentage of months that the county had a managed care 
mandate in effect.  The sample consists of 810 county-period observations for the 14 six-month periods 
(Jan-June or July-Dec) from 1993-1999.  Standard errors are reported in brackets and are clustered by 
county to account for serial correlation in the error term.  Both sets of regressions include county and time 
effects and are weighted by the number of Medicaid births.  Regressions summarized in the third column 
also include county-specific time trends. 
 
